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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 16-4126 
 ___________ 
 
HELENA FAHERTY, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-00395) 
 District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2017 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, FUENTES, Circuit Judge, and STARK,* Chief District 
Judge 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 11, 2017) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION** 
 _________ 
 
                                         
* Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Helena Faherty appeals an adverse summary judgment ruling on her Title VII suit.  
We will affirm. 
Faherty, a Caucasian woman,1 worked for the Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”) as a Supervisory Transportation Security Officer at 
Philadelphia’s international airport.  Prompted by an anonymous letter, in 2007 the TSA 
began investigating allegations of widespread overtime and scheduling abuses by the 
supervisory staff.  The initial stages of the investigation were conducted by a Federal Air 
Marshal, whose preliminary findings—that Faherty was one of seven supervisors who 
had potentially falsified her time and attendance records—were then handed off to TSA 
management.   
When confronted, Faherty denied any wrongdoing and provided explanations for 
some of the alleged discrepancies.  As she explained, her time and leave practices had 
been authorized by her former manager (since deceased), who signed off on her time 
sheets and allowed her to telework from home on occasion.  
The final disciplinary decision was entrusted to George E. Clisby, the airport’s 
Acting Deputy Federal Security Director, who thought Faherty’s violations were serious 
enough to warrant her termination.  According to his written Notice of Decision on 
Proposed Removal, Clisby identified inconsistencies in Faherty’s account of the 
                                         
1 Faherty elsewhere identifies herself as Hispanic/Native American.  We use the 
designation from her appellate brief; ultimately, the distinction is not material.   
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permission her deceased manager had allegedly granted—which Clisby could not, for 
obvious reasons, verify with the manager—and in her underlying conduct.  In Faherty’s 
protestations of innocence, Clisby saw instead a “failure to take responsibility for the 
misconduct,” suggesting that her “potential for rehabilitation [wa]s poor.”2   
In the end, of the seven supervisors investigated, six saw their employment with 
the TSA come to an end.  Two resigned before formal disciplinary proceedings began.  
Four others (including Faherty) were let go.   
Faherty’s lawsuit focuses on the odd one out: supervisor CH, who was demoted 
instead of fired despite a similar—or, as Faherty asserts, more egregious—pattern of time 
and leave violations.  Like Faherty, CH claimed during the disciplinary proceedings that 
some of his apparent “violations” had in fact been authorized by his manager.  But while 
Clisby had not believed Faherty, he did credit CH’s excuse, declining to sustain certain of 
the disciplinary charges against him.  Because Clisby, like CH, is an African American 
man, Faherty charged that she had been the victim of race and gender discrimination and, 
as a result, had been fired in violation of the law.   
Applying the familiar three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
for Title VII claims—plaintiff’s prima facie case, employer’s legitimate reason, 
plaintiff’s demonstration that the “legitimate reason” is pretextual3—the District Court 
                                         
2 App. 79.   
3 See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 
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granted summary judgment in favor of the TSA.  Particularly salient to the District Court 
were two differences between CH’s situation and Faherty’s.  First, unlike Faherty, CH 
was able to offer a sworn statement from his manager that backed up parts of his story—
for instance, that he sincerely thought he could go home 59 minutes early without 
claiming leave.4  Second, CH admitted his mistake and accepted responsibility, 
promising that, if retained as a TSA employee, he would “not repeat the [mis]conduct.”  
Clisby took this into account as a positive factor in CH’s “potential for rehabilitation.”5  
The District Court concluded that Faherty failed to make the required showing, through 
either direct or circumstantial evidence, that a reasonable factfinder could find 
impermissible racial or gender-based discrimination.  Faherty appealed.6 
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the District Court that, assuming 
Faherty’s success at the first step of McDonnell Douglas, she has failed to show that the 
TSA’s proffered reason for terminating her was actually pretext for discrimination.  
Faherty dedicates more than ten pages of her brief to identifying what she describes as 
CH’s extensive derelictions, which (by her calculation) far exceeded her own in scope 
and severity.  But it appears undisputed that Clisby did not assess the raw data from 
which Faherty draws support, and instead based his analysis on his predecessors’ audit—
                                         
4 See Faherty v. Johnson, 209 F. Supp. 3d 797, 802 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  We note that CH’s 
manager was also demoted.  
5 App. 99; see Faherty, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 802. 
6 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct plenary review of the District 
Court’s summary judgment decision.  Jones, 796 F.3d at 325.   
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a technique he also appeared to use in Faherty’s own review.  And Faherty has not shown 
discriminatory animus by any TSA employees who curated the data for Clisby’s use.  
Faherty also contends that the District Court impermissibly made credibility 
determinations and otherwise resolved inferences against her, which it may not do at the 
summary judgment stage.7  Her discussion of credibility determinations, however, 
focuses on Clisby’s decision to credit CH’s excuses while disbelieving her own.  It would 
indeed be impermissible for the District Court to disregard evidence suggesting that 
Clisby’s decisions involved racial or gender animus, but that is not what the Court did.  
Rather, it acknowledged Clisby’s stated reasons for demoting CH while firing Flaherty: 
CH “fessed up” and also provided a statement from his manager that partially backed up 
his excuse.  We reject Faherty’s assertion that the District Court misapplied the summary 
judgment standard.8 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
                                         
7 See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2013).  
8 Faherty asserts also that the District Court improperly considered “hearsay” allegations 
and looked to factual allegations “not identified in defendant’s statement of material 
facts.”  Appellant’s Br. at 6, 20.  These arguments, made only in passing and not 
developed further, are waived.  See Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 
242, 248 n.5 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 WL 2216954 (May 22, 2017).  
